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QUESTION PRESENTED 
 
 Is this common law nuisance suit non-justiciable 
under the political question doctrine? 
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
 
 Amici curiae, listed below, are law professors who 
teach, research, and write about environmental law, 
constitutional law, and torts.  They have an interest in 
preserving the courts’ traditional authority to adjudicate 
common law claims involving the environment.  Most 
participated as amici in two similar nuisance cases in the 
Courts of Appeals, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 
855 (5th Cir. 2009), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th 
Cir. 2010), and Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil 
Corp., appeal pending, No. 09-17490 (9th Cir.).  Amici file 
this brief as individuals and not on behalf of the 
institutions with which they are affiliated.1 
 
 Randall S. Abate is Associate Professor of Law at 
Florida A&M University College of Law. 
 
 Denise E. Antolini is Professor of Law and Director of 
the Environmental Law Program at the University of 
Hawai‘i at Mānoa, William S. Richardson School of Law. 
 
 William W. Buzbee is Professor of Law, Director of the 
Environmental and Natural Resources Law Program, and 
Director of the Center on Federalism and Intersystemic 
Governance at Emory Law School. 
 
 Federico Cheever is Professor and Associate Dean for 
Academic Affairs at the University of Denver, Sturm 
College of Law. 
                                                 
1 The parties have consented to the filing of this brief in letters on file 
in the Clerk’s office.  No counsel for any party authored this brief in 
whole or in part, and no person or entity, other than amici, their 
counsel, and their institutions, made a monetary contribution 
intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. 
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 Jamison E. Colburn is Professor of Law at Penn State 
University. 
 
 Robin Kundis Craig is Associate Dean for 
Environmental Programs and Attorneys’ Title Professor of 
Law at the Florida State University College of Law. 
 
 Holly Doremus is Professor of Law at the University of 
California, Berkeley, School of Law. 
 
 Daniel Farber is Sho Sato Professor of Law at the 
University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. 
 
 Robert L. Glicksman is J.B. & Maurice C. Shapiro 
Professor of Environmental Law at George Washington 
University Law School. 
 
 Oliver A. Houck is Professor of Law at Tulane 
University Law School. 
 
 David Hunter is Associate Professor of Law and 
Director of International and Comparative Environmental 
Law at American University, Washington College of Law. 
 
 Alice Kaswan is Professor of Law at the University of 
San Francisco School of Law. 
 
 Alexandra B. Klass is Associate Professor of Law at 
the University of Minnesota Law School. 
 
 Sarah Krakoff is Associate Dean for Research and 
Professor of Law at the University of Colorado Law 
School. 
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 JoEllen Lind is Professor of Law and Associate Dean 
for Faculty Development at Valparaiso University School 
of Law. 
 
 Patricia Ross McCubbin is Professor of Law at 
Southern Illinois University School of Law. 
 
 Jeffrey G. Miller is Professor of Law and Vice Dean for 
Academic Affairs at Pace University School of Law. 
 
 Kenneth M. Murchison is James E. and Betty M. 
Phillips Professor at Louisiana State University, Paul M. 
Hebert Law Center. 
 
 Hari M. Osofsky is Associate Professor of Law, 
Associate Director of Law, Geography & Environment, 
Consortium on Law and Values in Health, Environment 
& the Life Sciences, and Adjunct Associate Professor of 
Geography at the University of Minnesota. 
 
 Patrick A. Parenteau is Professor of Law and Senior 
Counsel, Environmental and Natural Resources Law 
Clinic, at Vermont Law School. 
 
 Robert V. Percival is Robert F. Stanton Professor of 
Law and Director of the Environmental Law Program at 
the University of Maryland School of Law. 
 
 Zygmunt J.B. Plater is Professor of Law at Boston 
College Law School. 
 
 Mary Christina Wood is Philip H. Knight Professor 
and Faculty Director, Environmental and Natural 
Resources Law Program, at the University of Oregon 
School of Law. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
 I. Under the political question doctrine, certain 
constitutional issues are reserved to the political branches 
for decision.  The doctrine has no application to common 
law claims like the one in this case.  The Court should 
reject petitioners’ invitation to extend the doctrine far 
beyond its traditional limits. 
 
A. In every case in which the Court has found federal 
jurisdiction lacking because of the political question 
doctrine, the plaintiff’s claim has been founded on the 
Constitution.  Meanwhile the Court has addressed a great 
many common law issues over the years, without ever 
suggesting, much less holding, that any of them might be 
political questions.  This sharp distinction is not a mere 
matter of labeling.  It is a fundamental divide 
necessitated by the very nature of the political question 
doctrine, which is rooted in the Constitution’s separation 
of powers.  The six formulations established in Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), are tools for dividing 
constitutional claims between the competence of the 
courts and the political branches.  They have never had 
any bearing on common law claims, which are always 
within the competence of courts.   
 
B. Whenever a constitutional issue that is non-
justiciable under the political question doctrine has arisen 
within a lawsuit under the common law, the Court has 
deferred to the political branches’ resolution of the 
constitutional issue, but has nevertheless always retained 
jurisdiction over the common law case and decided it on 
the merits.  In such cases the Court has never decided 
that the common law claim itself is non-justiciable. 
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 C. There is no reason to accept petitioners’ invitation 
to expand the political question doctrine far beyond its 
traditional confines.  A legal issue is not converted into a 
political question simply because one might have policy 
grounds for preferring that it be resolved by another 
branch of government.  Even if this nuisance suit will be 
as novel and complex as petitioners allege, their concerns 
can be addressed the way such concerns have always been 
addressed, through the courts’ interpretation of the 
common law of nuisance. 
 
 II. Even if the political question doctrine applied to 
non-constitutional issues, this nuisance claim would not 
be a political question.  None of the six Baker 
formulations is inextricable from this case.  The authority 
to resolve common law nuisance claims is neither 
textually nor implicitly committed to either Congress or 
the President. 
 
 A. This nuisance claim is not textually committed to 
the political branches.  The Constitution does not commit 
to the political branches the exclusive power to resolve 
nuisance claims, to adjudicate environmental disputes, or 
to address the question of climate change.  If there is any 
constitutional text authorizing one of the branches to 
decide this case, it is Article III, which explicitly provides 
that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law 
and Equity.” 
 
 B. This nuisance claim is governed by judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards.  Petitioners 
argue that because the law of nuisance incorporates a 
broad reasonableness standard rather than a set of 
precise rules, there will be no “right” or “wrong” answers 
in this case.  But that is an argument that would make 
political questions out of all nuisance cases, not just this 
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one.  Indeed, all of the Court’s prior nuisance cases were 
governed by the very same standards that petitioners 
claim are undiscoverable in this case. 
 
 An issue does not become non-justiciable merely 
because it is governed by a broad standard like 
reasonableness.  An issue is non-justiciable when it is 
governed by no standard at all.  When the applicable 
standard is merely broadly worded or incapable of being 
reduced to bright line rules, the Court has consistently 
refused to hold that an issue is a political question. 
 
 C. This nuisance claim can be decided without an 
initial policy determination of the kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion.  This Baker formulation prevents 
courts from making only those policy determinations that 
are clearly within the exclusive power of the executive 
branch, involving matters like which nation has 
sovereignty over disputed territory, and it proscribes only 
decisions explicitly setting forth the policy of the United 
States on a particular matter.  It does not bar courts from 
making the implicit policy judgments they traditionally 
make in common law cases. 
 
 D. None of the remaining Baker formulations is 
inextricable from this case.  A court applying the common 
law would not express any lack of the respect due to the 
political branches.  The common law of nuisance cannot 
override any decisions already made by the political 
branches.  And there is no possibility of inconsistent 
pronouncements by the judiciary and another branch, 
because the other branches can always displace the 
common law of nuisance. 
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A.  ARGUMENT 
 
 The political question doctrine limits judicial review of 
certain constitutional claims that are committed to the 
political branches.  The Court has never held, or even 
suggested, that the doctrine forecloses judicial review of 
common law claims like the one in this case.  And even if 
the political question doctrine limited judicial 
consideration of common law claims, the claim in this case 
would not be a political question. 
 
I. The Political Question Doctrine Has No 
    Application to Issues of Common Law. 
 
 The political question doctrine has no application to 
issues of common law, like the nuisance claim in this case.  
The doctrine is a judicial gloss on the Constitution’s 
separation of powers, under which there are certain 
constitutional issues that the Constitution reserves, 
textually or implicitly, to the political branches for 
decision.  The common law, by contrast, is the province of 
the judiciary, which is the only branch with the authority 
to interpret the common law. 
 
 The Court has always adhered to this distinction 
between constitutional claims and common law claims.  In 
every case in which the Court has found federal 
jurisdiction lacking because of the political question 
doctrine, the plaintiff’s claim has been founded on a 
provision of the Constitution.  The Court has decided 
many common law issues, but it has never suggested that 
any of them were non-justiciable under the political 
question doctrine.  Perhaps the clearest evidence of this 
sharp distinction can be found in the cases in which a 
non-justiciable constitutional issue has arisen within a 
lawsuit under the common law, as an element of the 
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plaintiff’s or the defendant’s case.  In such cases, the 
Court’s consistent practice has been to defer to the 
political branches’ resolution of the constitutional issue, 
but nevertheless to retain jurisdiction and to decide the 
common law issue on the merits.  Common law issues are 
never political questions.2 
 
 There is no reason to accept petitioners’ invitation to 
expand the political question doctrine far beyond its 
traditional confines.  Petitioners’ concerns can be 
addressed the traditional way, through the courts’ 
interpretation of the common law of nuisance. 
 
A. This Court Has Never Found a Common Law 
Claim Non-Justiciable Under the Political 
Question Doctrine. 
 
In every case in which the Court has found federal 
jurisdiction lacking because of the political question 
doctrine, the plaintiff’s claim has been a constitutional 
claim.  See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) 
(plurality opinion) (Article I and Equal Protection Clause); 
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (Impeachment 
Trial Clause); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (Due 
Process Clause); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) 
(Article V); Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist., 
281 U.S. 74 (1930) (Guarantee Clause); Massachusetts v. 
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (Tenth Amendment); 
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917) 
(Guarantee Clause); Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 
                                                 
2 Respondent Tennessee Valley Authority is only half right in 
observing that “this case differs from most cases presenting a political 
question: Plaintiffs are not asking the courts to enforce a 
constitutional or another external standard or norm that is typically 
in the domain of nonjudicial actors.”  TVA Br. at 39-40.  In fact, this 
case differs from all of this Court’s prior such cases. 
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U.S. 565 (1916) (Guarantee Clause); Kiernan v. City of 
Portland, 223 U.S. 151 (1912) (Guarantee Clause); Pacific 
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) 
(Guarantee Clause); Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 
(1900) (Guarantee Clause and Due Process Clause); 
Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. 50 (1867) (Constitutional 
challenge to Reconstruction Acts). 
 
Common law issues, by contrast, are never political 
questions.  The Court has addressed a great many 
questions of common law over the years, without any 
suggestion that any of them might be non-justiciable as 
political questions.  Many of these have been common law 
nuisance cases.  Some have involved disputes that raised 
scientifically complex and politically sensitive questions of 
environmental policy, including the appropriate levels of 
pollution in the Atlantic Ocean, the Great Lakes, and the 
Mississippi River.  New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 
U.S. 473 (1931) (Atlantic Ocean); Illinois v. City of 
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (Lake Michigan); Ohio v. 
Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971) (Lake Erie); 
Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (Mississippi 
River).  Yet the Court has never even suggested, much 
less held, that these common law nuisance claims might 
be political questions.  Rather, the Court has affirmed 
that the federal courts have jurisdiction to decide them.  
Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 98, 108; Ohio v. 
Wyandotte Chems., 401 U.S. at 495-96; New Jersey v. New 
York, 283 U.S. at 476; Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. at 
241. 
 
As the Court held in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals, in 
light of this long history, “precedent leads almost 
ineluctably to the conclusion that we are empowered to 
resolve this dispute.”  401 U.S. at 496.  The case involved 
Ohio’s effort to stop several Canadian and American 
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chemical companies from dumping mercury into streams 
that reached Lake Erie.  It involved extraordinarily 
difficult factual questions concerning whether Ohio 
residents had experienced any actual harm and the extent 
to which the defendants had contributed to that harm.  
“We already know,” the Court explained, 
 
that Lake Erie suffers from several sources of 
pollution other than mercury; that the scientific 
consensus that mercury is a serious water 
pollutant is a novel one; that whether and to what 
extent the existence of mercury in natural waters 
can safely or reasonably be tolerated is a question 
for which there is no firm answer; and that 
virtually no published research is available 
describing how one might extract mercury that is 
in fact contaminating water. 
 
Id. at 503-04.  The Court recognized that “Ohio is raising 
factual questions that are essentially ones of first 
impression to the scientists.”  Id. at 504.  The Court 
acknowledged that it lacked jurisdiction over suits “that 
seek to embroil this tribunal in ‘political questions.’”  Id. 
at 496.  Nevertheless, the Court concluded, “[t]hat we 
have jurisdiction seems clear enough.”  Id. at 495.  The 
Court declined to exercise its discretionary original 
jurisdiction – not because the case presented a political 
question, but because an ordinary trial court would be 
better suited to adjudicate the case in the first instance.  
Id. at 505.  See also Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 108 
(declining to exercise original jurisdiction over nuisance 
suit, but remitting the case “to an appropriate district 
court whose powers are adequate to resolve the issues”). 
 
 Further evidence that the political question doctrine 
applies only to constitutional issues can be found in 
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Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Soc’y, 478 
U.S. 221 (1986), a case in which wildlife conservation 
groups alleged that federal statutes required the 
Secretary of Commerce to take action against Japan for 
exceeding its annual quota of whales under an 
international treaty.  The defendants argued that the 
issue – although statutory rather than constitutional – 
was a non-justiciable political question because it was so 
closely connected with foreign relations.  The Court 
disagreed; it held that an issue of statutory interpretation 
does not present a political question.  “[I]t goes without 
saying that interpreting congressional legislation is a 
recurring and accepted task for the federal courts,” the 
Court explained.  “[U]nder the Constitution, one of the 
Judiciary’s characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, 
and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely because 
our decision may have significant political overtones.”  Id. 
at 230.  See also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 
(2007) (finding no political question where “[t]he parties’ 
dispute turns on the proper construction of a 
congressional statute, a question eminently suitable to 
resolution in federal court”).  The interpretation of the 
common law, like the interpretation of statutes, is a 
traditional and characteristic function of the courts.  Only 
constitutional issues can be political questions.3 
 
                                                 
3 In Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 
U.S. 103 (1948), the Court determined that the Civil Aeronautics Act 
did not authorize judicial review of certain orders of the Civil 
Aeronautics Board regarding overseas air transportation.  While the 
Court cited some of the same separation-of-powers concerns that 
motivate the political question doctrine, id. at 111, the decision rested 
on the Court’s interpretation of the statute, not on the political 
question doctrine.  Id. at 106 (“This Court long has held that statutes 
which employ broad terms to confer powers of judicial review are not 
always to be read literally”). 
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For this reason, the Court has described the doctrine 
as one that can deprive a federal court of jurisdiction over 
constitutional claims, not other kinds of claims.  United 
States Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 458 
(1992) (“In invoking the political question doctrine, a 
court acknowledges the possibility that a constitutional 
provision may not be judicially enforceable”); Webster v. 
Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 612-13 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“we have found some constitutional claims to be beyond 
judicial review because they involve ‘political questions’”). 
 
Commentators have likewise consistently described 
the political question doctrine as one that applies only to 
constitutional issues.  Laurence Tribe, for example, 
summarizes the political question doctrine as one that 
requires “federal courts to determine whether 
constitutional provisions which litigants would have 
judges enforce do in fact lend themselves to interpretation 
as guarantees of enforceable rights.”  Laurence H. Tribe, 
American Constitutional Law 385 (3d ed. 2000).  As Tribe 
explains, “[a]n issue is political not because it is one of 
particular concern to the political branches of government 
but because the constitutional provisions which litigants 
would invoke as guides to resolution of the issue do not 
lend themselves to judicial application.”  Id. at 370. 
 
See also Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, et al., 
13C Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction and 
Related Matters § 3534.3 (3d ed.) (“Challenges to official 
action or inaction are the stuff of the separation-of-powers 
concerns that underlie political-question reasoning”); 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 147 (5th ed. 
2007) (defining the doctrine as requiring “that certain 
allegations of unconstitutional government conduct 
should not be ruled on by the federal courts”); Jesse H. 
Choper, “The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested 
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Criteria,” 54 Duke L.J. 1457, 1458 (2005) (defining the 
doctrine as stating “that courts should abstain from 
resolving constitutional issues that are better left to other 
departments of government”); Rachel E. Barkow, “More 
Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question 
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy,” 102 Colum. 
L. Rev. 237, 239-40 (2002) (“Underlying the political 
question doctrine . . . is the recognition that the political 
branches possess institutional characteristics that make 
them superior to the judiciary in deciding certain 
constitutional questions”); Mark Tushnet, “Law and 
Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation 
and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine,” 80 
N.C. L. Rev. 1203, 1207 (2002) (“For the political question 
doctrine, the ‘issue,’ in the Court’s sense, is: Who gets to 
decide what the right answer to a substantive 
constitutional question is?”); Martin H. Redish, “Judicial 
Review and the ‘Political Question,’” 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
1031, 1031 (1985) (“The so-called ‘political question’ 
doctrine postulates that there exist certain issues of 
constitutional law that are more effectively resolved by 
the political branches of government and are therefore 
inappropriate for judicial resolution”); Louis Henkin, “Is 
There a ‘Political Question’ Doctrine?”, 85 Yale L.J. 597, 
599 (1976) (“a political question is one in which the courts 
forego their unique and paramount function of judicial 
review of constitutionality”); Tribe, supra, at 367 
(“Professor Henkin is clearly right that one should not 
accept lightly the proposition that there are provisions of 
the Constitution which the courts may not independently 
interpret”). 
 
Amici Law Professors try to avoid this sharp 
distinction between constitutional issues and common law 
issues by insisting that all of the Court’s “cases presenting 
political questions are predicated on causes of action that 
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are, like tort actions, justiciable in other instances.”  Brief 
for Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 23.  What they do not mention is that every 
such political question has involved a constitutional 
claim.  The fact that some constitutional claims are non-
justiciable has no bearing on whether any common law 
claims are non-justiciable. 
Petitioners rely heavily on language from Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Pet. Br. at 46, but they have 
plucked that language out of context.  In Baker, the Court 
lists several “formulations” describing when prior cases 
had found an issue non-justiciable.  Among these are “a 
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
for resolving it,” and “the impossibility of deciding without 
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion.”  369 U.S. at 217.  These 
“formulations,” however, are relevant to deciding which 
constitutional questions should be deemed non-justiciable.  
They have no bearing on questions of common law.  The 
Court makes that clear in the very next paragraph of 
Baker, which explains that courts should refer to these 
formulations in determining “whether some action 
denominated ‘political’ exceeds constitutional authority.”  
Id.  Baker itself involved a claim under the Equal 
Protection Clause.  All the Court’s subsequent cases 
applying the Baker formulations have likewise involved 
constitutional claims.  Vieth, 541 U.S. 267 at 277-78 
(plurality opinion) (Article I and Equal Protection Clause); 
Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228 (Impeachment Trial Clause); 
United States Dep’t of Commerce, 503 U.S. at 456 (Article 
I); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 389-90 
(1990) (Origination Clause); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 
109, 121-22 (1986) (Equal Protection Clause); County of 
Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 248-50 
(1985) (Indian Commerce Clause); INS v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919, 940-42 (1983) (Article I); Powell v. McCormack, 
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395 U.S. 486, 518-19 (1969) (Article I).  The Baker 
formulations are a tool for dividing constitutional claims 
between the competence of courts and the political 
branches.  They have no relevance to common law claims, 
because common law claims are always within the 
competence of courts. 
This distinction between constitutional issues and 
common law issues is not a mere matter of labeling or 
“semantic cataloguing,” Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.  It is a 
fundamental divide necessitated by the very nature of the 
political question doctrine.  At bottom, “[t]he 
nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a 
function of the separation of powers.”  Id. at 210.  The 
Constitution’s text commits certain tasks to branches 
other than the judiciary.  Its structure may so commit 
others.  But the adjudication of common law cases is at 
the core of the judiciary’s constitutional role.  It is 
committed to the judiciary both textually, in the words of 
Article III (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, 
in Law and Equity”), and structurally, in the relationship 
of Article III to Articles I and II, neither of which 
authorizes the other branches to do anything remotely 
similar.  As the Court has explained, “[t]he judicial 
Power” created by Article III is “the power to act in the 
manner traditional for English and American courts.”  
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 (plurality opinion).  Nothing could 
be more traditional than the adjudication of a common 
law case, the judiciary’s core function since long before the 
Constitution was enacted. 
There are two sound prudential reasons for this clear 
line between constitutional and common law issues.  
First, when courts interpret the Constitution, they are the 
final arbiters.  The political branches cannot undo what 
the courts have done.  The separation-of-powers concerns 
underlying the political question doctrine are thus at their 
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strongest, because the political branches cannot provide a 
check on judicial action.  When courts interpret the 
common law, by contrast, the political branches can 
override their rulings at any time.  In such cases, the 
political branches themselves can police the judiciary.  
The separation-of-powers concerns that lie behind the 
political question doctrine are substantially weaker. 
Second, if the political question doctrine applied to all 
issues, not just constitutional issues, the doctrine would 
cease to be “a delicate exercise in constitutional 
interpretation,” Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.  If the doctrine 
were to lose its constitutional grounding, it would lack 
any limiting principle.  It would become a free-floating 
discretionary power of federal courts to disclaim 
jurisdiction over factually complex or politically sensitive 
cases.  But of course federal courts have no such power.  
They must hear even the most difficult cases brought 
before them.  Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Engineers, 130 S. Ct. 584, 590 (2009); 
Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 298 (2006); Cohens v. 
Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821). 
 
B. When a Non-Justiciable Constitutional Issue 
Has Arisen Within a Common Law Claim, 
the Court Has Always Taken  
Jurisdiction and Decided the Common Law 
Claim on the Merits, After  
Deferring to the Political Branches’ 
Resolution of the Constitutional Issue. 
 
Constitutional issues sometimes arise within lawsuits 
brought under the common law, as parts of either the 
plaintiff’s or the defendant’s case.  Sometimes those 
constitutional issues are non-justiciable as political 
questions.  In such cases, the Court’s uniform practice has 
been to defer to the political branches’ resolution of the 
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non-justiciable constitutional issue, but nevertheless to 
take jurisdiction and decide the common law claim on the 
merits.  The Court has never decided that the common 
law claim itself is non-justiciable. 
 
The best-known example is Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 
1 (1849).  Although Luther is usually remembered for 
holding that Guarantee Clause claims are non-justiciable, 
the case itself was an action for trespass, for breaking and 
entering a house.  Id. at 34.  The plaintiff was one of the 
participants in the Dorr Rebellion; the defendants were 
officers of the established “charter” government of Rhode 
Island, which was attempting to suppress the rebellion.  
Id.  As part of the plaintiff’s case, he argued that the 
charter government lacked lawful power – that the rebel 
government was the real one – and that the defendants 
thus had no authority to enter his house.  Id. at 38.  It 
was this particular argument that the Court found non-
justiciable, on the ground that the political branches have 
the sole power to determine whether a state government 
is genuine.  Id. at 39-43.  But the Court did not find the 
case non-justiciable as a whole.  The Court did not 
dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.  Rather, the 
Court decided the case on the merits.  The case had been 
tried below to a jury, which had returned a verdict for the 
defendants.  Id. at 18.  This Court affirmed that 
judgment.  Id. at 47.  The plaintiff’s argument about the 
true government of Rhode Island was non-justiciable, but 
his common law action for trespass was justiciable.4 
 
                                                 
4 Amici Consumer Energy Alliance et al. summarize Luther 
incorrectly.  Brief of Amici Curiae Consumer Energy Alliance et al. at 
21.  The Court did not hold that the common law trespass claim in 
Luther was non-justiciable.  The Court decided that issue on the 
merits. 
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Every time a political question has arisen within a 
common law case, the Court has likewise deferred to the 
political branches on the political question but has 
decided the case on the merits.  Oetjen v. Central Leather 
Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) (suit for replevin decided on the 
merits, after deferring to the political branches as to 
which was the legitimate government of Mexico, an issue 
the Constitution exclusively commits to the political 
branches); Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884) 
(suit for breach of contract decided on the merits, after 
deferring to the political branches on the question of 
whether to make treasury notes legal tender, an issue the 
Constitution exclusively commits to the political 
branches); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. 635 (1853) (suit for 
ejection decided on the merits, after deferring to the 
political branches as to the validity of a treaty, an issue 
the Constitution exclusively commits to the political 
branches); Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. 415 (1839) 
(action of assumpsit decided on the merits, after deferring 
to the political branches as to which government had 
jurisdiction over the Falkland Islands, an issue the 
Constitution exclusively commits to the political 
branches).  As the Court explained in Juilliard, the 
wisdom of using one sort of currency or another “is a 
political question, to be determined by congress when the 
question of exigency arises, and not a judicial question.”  
110 U.S. at 450.  Nevertheless, the Court held, “[t]here 
can . . . be no doubt of the jurisdiction of this court” over 
the breach of contract claim.  Id. at 436. 
 
When a political question arises within a non-
constitutional case, the Court’s consistent practice has 
thus been to take jurisdiction of the case, despite 
deferring to the political branches on the political 
question.  The Court explained this consistent practice in 
Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918).  
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Ricaud was a suit in equity to recover lead bullion 
imported from Mexico.  One element of the plaintiff’s case 
was the allegation that the ostensible government of 
Mexico, the source of the defendant’s title, was in fact not 
the legitimate government of Mexico.  The Court held that 
because the United States had recognized that 
government as legitimate, the judiciary could not decide 
the question anew.  It was a question constitutionally 
committed to the political branches.  The Court continued: 
“This last rule, however, does not deprive the courts of 
jurisdiction once acquired over a case.” Id. at 309. The 
resolution of the political question by the political 
branches “must be accepted by our courts as a rule for 
their decision.” Id. Nevertheless, “[t]o accept a ruling 
authority and to decide accordingly is not a surrender or 
abandonment of jurisdiction but is an exercise of it.” Id. 
The Court proceeded to decide the case on the merits. 
 
Amicus Chamber of Commerce correctly notes that 
the Court has “refused to adjudicate political questions 
even when such questions arise in the context of private 
litigation involving common law.”  Brief Amicus Curiae of 
the Chamber of Commerce at 17.  The important thing, 
however, is that when a political question has arisen 
within a common law case, the Court has not dismissed 
the case for lack of jurisdiction.  The Court has exercised 
jurisdiction and decided the case on the merits. 
 
An issue of common law, therefore, can never be non-
justiciable under the political question doctrine.  Only 
constitutional claims can be non-justiciable as political 
questions.  Because the present case involves a common 
law claim of nuisance, the political question doctrine is no 
bar to the federal courts’ exercise of jurisdiction. 
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C. There is No Reason to Expand the  
Political Question Doctrine to Include 
Common Law Claims. 
 
Petitioners are not arguing that there is a 
constitutional provision requiring federal courts to defer 
to the political branches on some element of the case, such 
as the validity of a treaty or the authenticity of a 
government.  Rather, they are arguing that the entire 
case itself is non-justiciable.  They are urging the Court to 
expand the political question doctrine far beyond its 
traditional confines.  But even if this nuisance suit will be 
as novel and complex as petitioners allege, such a radical 
departure from precedent is hardly necessary.  
Petitioners’ concerns can be addressed the traditional 
way, through the courts’ interpretation of the common law 
of nuisance. 
 
A legal issue is not converted into a political question 
simply because one might have policy grounds for 
preferring that it be resolved by another branch of 
government.  Those policy concerns can be addressed in 
many other ways, none of which would require twisting 
the political question doctrine beyond recognition.  As the 
leading treatise on the federal courts explains: 
 
Traditional use of the political-question label 
stops short of embracing all the myriad 
circumstances in which courts conclude that a 
particular problem is better addressed by another 
branch.  A decision not to create a new common-
law cause of action, for example, may well rest on 
a sense that the subject is better suited to 
legislative or even administrative action, without 
even pausing to think of political-question 
doctrine. 
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Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, et al., 13C Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction and Related Matters 
§ 3534.3 (3d ed.).  If there are pressing reasons 
respondents should not prevail in their nuisance suit, 
they are reasons of nuisance law, and they can be 
addressed by a decision on the merits.  There is no need 
for a drastic expansion of the political question doctrine.  
Petitioners’ own amici demonstrate that the courts have 
had no trouble rejecting innovative nuisance suits on the 
merits, by applying the substantive law of nuisance.  Brief 
of Amici Curiae National Federation of Independent 
Business Small Business Legal Center et al. at 10-12.  
And if Amici’s arguments are correct, the courts will have 
no trouble doing the same here.  Id. at 12-27. 
 
Under the common law of nuisance, respondents will 
have to prove that the pollution produced by petitioners 
“is an unreasonable interference with a right common to 
the general public.”  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
821B(1).  If the questions of causation and harm in this 
case are in fact as intractable as petitioners allege, 
respondents will not be able to prove their case.  Among 
the circumstances a court will have to consider are 
“[w]hether the conduct involves a significant interference 
with the public health” and “whether the conduct . . . has 
produced a permanent or long-lasting effect.”  Id., § 
821B(2).  If such matters are as fraught with uncertainty 
as petitioners contend, respondents will not be able to 
sustain their burden of proof. 
 
In making these determinations, courts will be doing 
what they have always done:  they will be adapting the 
common law of nuisance to new problems.  New 
technologies have always given rise to new and difficult 
questions of nuisance law, and courts have always been 
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able to develop the common law, case by case, in response 
to these new questions.  When the earliest railroads were 
assailed as nuisances, for example, courts did not dismiss 
the suits for lack of jurisdiction, on the theory that only 
the political branches were equipped to make the difficult 
policy determinations of how many railroad lines the 
nation should have and where they should be located.  
When the railroads won, they won on the merits.  E.g., 
Lexington & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Applegate, 38 Ky. 289 
(1839).  Industrialization did not cause courts to treat 
nuisance suits against factories as political questions, on 
the theory that industrial policy was a new and complex 
subject best left to the political branches.  When the 
factories won, they won on the merits.  Paul M. Kurtz, 
“Nineteenth Century Anti-Entrepreneurial Nuisance 
Injunctions – Avoiding the Chancellor,” 17 Wm. & Mary 
L. Rev. 621 (1976).  When air pollution first became an 
important policy concern, courts did not dismiss nuisance 
suits against polluters, on the theory that there were no 
right or wrong answers to the question of how clean the 
air ought to be.  E.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 
206 U.S. 230 (1907).  When the polluters won, they won 
on the merits.  These were issues that in their day were 
just as controversial and just as difficult, in both a legal 
and a scientific sense, as climate change is today.  Yet 
courts were able to perform their traditional task of 
accommodating the law of nuisance to new circumstances. 
 
In the end, petitioners’ argument concerning the 
political question doctrine is, as Justice Holmes put it in a 
similar context, “little more than a play on words.”  Nixon 
v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927).  Climate change is a 
“political question” in the colloquial meaning of the 
phrase, in the sense that it is a question that has 
produced political controversy.  But so were school 
desegregation, and abortion, and capital punishment, and 
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scores of other issues over which the federal courts have 
exercised jurisdiction.  It is this colloquial sense of the 
phrase that Tocqueville had in mind when he wrote that 
“[t]here is almost no political question in the United 
States that is not resolved sooner or later into a judicial 
question.”  Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 
257 (Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop eds., 
2000).  The legal definition of a “political question,” 
however, is much narrower than its colloquial definition.  
Under the legal definition, a common law claim of 
nuisance has never been considered a political question, 
and there is no reason to start doing so now. 
 
The Court should instead hew closely to the political 
question doctrine’s limited reach.  After all, the doctrine is 
a creation of the courts themselves.  The only boundaries 
to the doctrine are found in the Court’s own cases.  Once 
those boundaries are burst, there would be no principled 
limit to the doctrine’s expansion. 
 
 
II. This Nuisance Claim Would Not Be a  
     Political Question Even if the Political    
     Question Doctrine Applied to Issues of  
     Common Law. 
 
 Petitioners’ argument rests on the erroneous 
assumption that the political question doctrine applies to 
non-constitutional issues.  Pet. Br. at 46-51.  But even if 
their assumption were correct, the nuisance claim in this 
case would not be a political question. 
 
 The Court’s political question jurisprudence has 
consisted of careful, case-by-case inquiries into “whether 
the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its 
breach judicially determined, and whether protection for 
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the right asserted can be judicially molded.”  Baker, 369 
U.S. at 198.  In Baker, the Court analyzed its prior cases 
and found six common “formulations” among the issues it 
had found to be political questions.  Id. at 217.  
“Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a 
political question,” the Court determined, is either: 
 
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] 
the impossibility of deciding without an initial 
policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a 
court’s undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of the respect due 
coordinate branches of government; or [5] an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or [6] the 
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one 
question. 
 
Id.  Dismissal is warranted only if at least one of these six 
elements is “inextricable” from the case.  Id. 
 
A plurality of the Court has suggested that these 
formulations “are probably listed in descending order of 
both importance and certainty.”  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 
(plurality opinion). 
 
 None of the six Baker formulations is “inextricable” 
from this case. 
 
A. This Nuisance Claim is Not Textually 
Committed to the Political Branches. 
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The most important and easily discernible of the 
Baker formulations is whether there is “a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department.”  Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.  
This Baker formulation requires explicit constitutional 
language, not inference from the Constitution’s structure 
or from the capacities of the three branches. 
 
The text of the Constitution does not assign the 
resolution of common law nuisance claims like this one to 
the legislative or executive branches.  Petitioners do not 
even try to argue that it does.  Articles I and II say 
nothing about any exclusive power of the political 
branches to resolve nuisance claims (or indeed any 
common law claims), to adjudicate environmental 
disputes, or to address the question of climate change.  
The Commerce Clause has never been understood to 
deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over cases involving 
interstate or international commerce.  Article III, by 
contrast, explicitly states that “[t]he judicial Power shall 
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity.”  U.S. Const. art. 
III, § 2.  If the Constitution textually commits this issue 
to any branch, it is the judiciary. 
 
This case is very different from the only two cases 
since Baker in which the Court has found issues textually 
committed to the political branches.  In Nixon, the Court 
determined that the trial of impeachments is textually 
committed to the Senate, and thus that the Senate’s 
choice of impeachment procedure is a political question.  
Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229-33.  The basis for this decision was 
Article I, Section 3, Clause 6, which says very clearly that 
“[t]he Senate shall have the sole Power to try all 
Impeachments.”  Id. at 229.  There is no comparable 
constitutional text in this case. 
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In Gilligan, the Court found that the organization and 
discipline of the National Guard is textually committed to 
Congress.  Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 6-9.  The basis for this 
decision was Article I, Section 8, Clause 16, which says 
that Congress has the power “[t]o provide for organizing, 
arming, and disciplining, the militia.”  Id. at 6.  There is 
no comparable constitutional text to govern this case.  
None, that is, except for Article III, which commits the 
issue to the courts. 
 
B. This Nuisance Claim is Governed by  
Judicially Discoverable and Manageable 
Standards. 
 
Petitioners rely almost entirely on the second Baker 
formulation, whether there is “a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards,” Baker, 369 U.S. 
at 217, for resolving this case.  Pet. Br. at 46-51.  They 
argue that because the law of nuisance is governed by a 
reasonableness standard rather than a set of precise 
rules, there will be no “right” or “wrong” answers in a 
nuisance case.  Id. at 48.  But an issue does not become a 
political question merely because it is governed by a broad 
standard like reasonableness.  An issue is a political 
question when it is governed by no standard at all. 
 
This nuisance case is a political question, petitioners 
argue, because the judge who decides it will “‘search[ ] in 
vain . . . for anything resembling a principle in the 
common law of nuisance.’”  Pet. Br. at 48 (quoting Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1055 
(1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).  Amici Consumer 
Energy Alliance et al. likewise worry that “[p]ublic 
nuisance law operates at such a high level of generality as 
to provide no meaningful notice or consistent standard of 
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application.”  Brief of Amici Curiae Consumer Energy 
Alliance et al. at 28. 
 
But this is an argument that would make political 
questions out of all nuisance cases, not just this one.  A 
legal issue does not transform into a political question 
simply because it is governed by a reasonableness 
standard.  If it did, not only would every nuisance case 
become a political question, but so would the vast swaths 
of the law – from negligence to the Fourth Amendment – 
that also require courts to determine what is reasonable.  
So would the great many constitutional issues that 
involve equally broad standards, like whether 
punishment is “cruel and unusual,” or whether 
congressional action is “necessary and proper.”  The fact 
that the law of nuisance cannot be reduced to a set of 
discrete principles, see Pet. Br. at 48, or an algorithm that 
spits out “right” and “wrong” answers, see id., is thus 
utterly beside the point.  The law of nuisance may be 
broadly worded, but it is hardly undiscoverable or 
unmanageable. 
 
The standards that will govern this case are in fact 
discoverable.  They can be discovered very easily, by 
reading the Restatement of Torts.  Courts have been 
applying them for centuries, without any suggestion that 
courts have been exceeding their jurisdiction all the while.  
Indeed, all the Court’s prior nuisance cases – none of 
which presented political questions – were governed by 
the very same standards that petitioners claim are 
undiscoverable in this case.  See, e.g., Illinois v. City of 
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Georgia v. Tennessee 
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 
U.S. 496 (1906).5 
                                                 
5 Amici Law Professors argue that the Restatement provides no 
standards where the alleged nuisance does not constitute a common 
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An issue does not become a political question under 
this Baker formulation merely because it is governed by a 
broad standard like reasonableness.  An issue is a 
political question when it is governed by no standard at 
all.  In Vieth, for instance, the plurality determined that 
political gerrymandering claims are non-justiciable, not 
because they require courts to apply a broad standard like 
reasonableness, but because courts had been unable to 
articulate any meaningful standard whatsoever.  Vieth, 
541 U.S. at 278-90 (plurality opinion).  In Coleman, the 
Court found that a claim under Article V was non-
justiciable, not because it was governed by a broad 
standard like reasonableness, but because it was not 
governed by any standard at all.  Coleman, 307 U.S. at 
450-54.  See also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1003 
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(concluding that a Senator’s challenge to the President’s 
abrogation of a treaty is non-justiciable, because while the 
Constitution sets forth the manner in which the Senate 
participates in the ratification of treaties, it provides no 
standards for the Senate’s participation in their 
abrogation). 
 
                                                                                                             
law crime.  Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 27.  Now that common law crimes are virtually 
nonexistent, however, this is an argument that would make political 
questions out of virtually all nuisance cases.  The TVA argues that 
only the political branches can provide standards for resolving 
common law nuisance cases.  TVA Br. at 39 n.17.  But this is an 
oxymoron: if courts were applying standards prescribed by another 
branch, they would no longer be applying the common law.  In 
common law cases, whether nuisance or any other kind, courts have 
always discovered the applicable standards within the common law 
itself. 
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Where the governing standard is merely broadly 
worded or incapable of being reduced to bright line rules, 
by contrast, the Court has consistently refused to hold 
that an issue is a political question.  In Munoz-Flores, for 
example, the government argued that claims under the 
Origination Clause are political questions, because it 
would be impossible for courts to fashion manageable 
standards to govern the issue.  Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 
395.  This Court disagreed.  “[T]he Government suggests 
no reason that developing such standards will be more 
difficult in this context than in any other,” the Court 
explained.  “Surely a judicial system capable of 
determining when punishment is ‘cruel and unusual,’ 
when bail is ‘[e]xcessive,’ when searches are 
‘unreasonable,’ and when congressional action is 
‘necessary and proper’ for executing an enumerated power 
is capable of making the more prosaic judgments 
demanded by adjudication of Origination Clause 
challenges.”  Id. at 395-96.  These are issues governed by 
standards at least as broad as the law governing 
nuisance, yet there has never been doubt that federal 
courts have jurisdiction to decide them.  See also Baker, 
369 U.S. at 226 (finding reapportionment claims 
justiciable because “[j]udicial standards under the Equal 
Protection Clause are well developed and familiar”). 
 
This nuisance claim might involve a more complex 
chain of causation than others, but this is a difference 
that has nothing to do with the existence of judicially 
discoverable standards.  The standards that will be 
applied to this case are exactly the same as the ones that 
courts have always applied to nuisance cases.  A more 
complex chain of causation might make this nuisance case 
more difficult to prove under the substantive law of 
nuisance, but the substantive law is no different. 
 
Banner and May: American Electric Power Company, Inc. v. State of Connecticut: Br
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
496 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46 
C. This Nuisance Claim Can Be Decided Without 
an Initial Policy Determination of the Kind 
Clearly for Nonjudicial  
Discretion. 
 
Petitioners claim, in a single sentence, that deciding 
this case will require “initial policy decisions” by judges.  
Pet. Br. at 51.  Amici Law Professors argue that judges 
will have to make implicit policy judgments about the 
social benefits of various methods of producing energy, 
about the fairness of imposing emission limits on 
petitioners but not their competitors, and about whether 
petitioners should bear the burden of doing their share to 
remedy a harm also caused by many others.  Brief for 
Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners 
at 24-25. 
 
Under Baker, however, a political question is one that 
requires judges to make a particular kind of policy 
decision – the kind “clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”  
369 U.S. at 217.  As Baker made clear, such policy 
decisions involve matters such as which nation has 
sovereignty over disputed territory, or whether a war has 
ended.  Id. at 212-13.  Policy decisions like these are 
clearly for the executive branch, not the judiciary.  And as 
Baker made equally clear, the Court was referring to overt 
policy decisions, decisions explicitly setting forth the 
policy of the United States on a particular matter, like 
whether to recognize a foreign government.  Id.  The 
Court was not referring to the implicit policy decisions 
courts make while deciding common law cases. 
 
This case will not require judges to make policy 
decisions that purport to represent the official policy of 
the United States on any matter, much less policy 
decisions that are clearly reserved to the political 
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branches.  Judges will have to decide only a legal 
question: whether petitioners are committing a common 
law nuisance harmful to respondents.  That alone is 
enough to render this Baker formulation inapplicable. 
 
Nor will this case require judges to step out of their 
judicial role to make implicit policy decisions that are 
“clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”  The policy 
determinations required by common-law decision-making 
are ones that have traditionally been within the province 
of the courts: they are not “clearly” relegated to 
“nonjudicial discretion.”  Many legal issues have policy 
implications of one kind or another.  At least since Oliver 
Wendell Holmes (and probably well before), it has been 
commonplace to observe that judges, in the course of 
deciding cases, are in effect making policy decisions, even 
if they do not explicitly say that is what they are doing.  
In that sense, judges deciding all nuisance cases can be 
said to make policy decisions.  In even the simplest of 
nuisance cases, such as a suit to enjoin a factory from 
polluting, a judge might have to weigh the harm from 
pollution against the cost to the community of the lost 
employment from the factory.  Such judgments are not 
the kind of policy decisions “clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion.”  They are the kind of policy decisions judges 
make every day.  If this case involves a political question, 
so does much of the normal work of the courts. 
 
It is thus hardly surprising that neither petitioners 
nor their amici can cite a single case in which this Court 
has found a political question simply because an issue has 
important policy implications.  There are no such cases.  
It is breathtakingly overbroad to suggest that the courts 
lack jurisdiction whenever Congress has authority – even 
untapped – to regulate a matter of interstate or 
international commerce.  See Brief Amicus Curiae of 
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Pacific Legal Foundation at 28-32; Brief Amicus Curiae of 
Cato Institute at 26-28.  If that were true, federal judges 
would have very little to do. 
 
This case may involve a more complex chain of 
causation than the typical nuisance case.  But that 
difference has nothing to do with whether the case 
requires “an initial policy determination of a kind clearly 
for nonjudicial discretion.”  Rather, it has to do with the 
burden respondents will have to shoulder under the 
substantive law of nuisance.  The fact that petitioners are 
not the only entities causing the alleged harm, for 
example, is a fact that a court will have to consider on the 
merits, in deciding whether respondents have sustained 
their burden of proof.  It is not a fact that has any bearing 
on whether this issue is a political question. 
 
The same is true of the fact that this nuisance suit 
will have a greater geographical scope than others the 
Court has adjudicated.  Cf. Brief for American Chemistry 
Council et al. at 14-18.  That might make this case harder 
to prove on the merits, but it has no bearing on whether 
the federal courts have jurisdiction to decide it.  The 
political question doctrine is about the nature of the 
issues in a case, not about the scope of the litigation or the 
number of parties to it.  The mere size and complexity of a 
case do not have constitutional relevance.  If they did, the 
political question doctrine would have no principled limit: 
it would swallow all kinds of complex litigation. 
 
D. None of the Remaining Baker  
Formulations Is Present. 
 
Petitioners do not assert the existence of the fourth, 
fifth, or sixth Baker formulations.  None is inextricable 
from this case.  A court applying the common law would 
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not express a “lack of the respect due coordinate branches 
of the government.”  Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.  Any common 
law decision a court reaches could effectively be undone 
by the political branches.  A decision in this case would be 
no more disrespectful to the other branches than a 
decision in any other common law case. 
 
For the same reasons, this case does not involve “an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political 
decision already made,” or “the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 
various departments on one question.”  Id.  The common 
law of nuisance cannot override any decisions already 
made by the political branches.  And there is no 
possibility of embarrassment from inconsistent 
pronouncements by the judiciary and another branch, 
because the other branches can always displace the 
common law of nuisance. 
 
Because none of the six Baker formulations is 
“inextricable” from this case, this nuisance claim would 
not be a political question even if the political question 
doctrine applied to issues of common law. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be 
affirmed. 
 
 Respectfully submitted, 
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